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2Abstract: Legal actions against non-humans (whether animals or 
objects) were once widespread.  They were viewed seriously and 
undoubtedly served important social functions.  This article considers 
the possibility that some of these actions may have been playful as well.  
Certain aspects of legal actions against animals and objects-- occasional 
moments of levity, a preoccupation with formal rules, and a strong 
emphasis on imaginative transformation-- suggest that these actions had 
elements of play. The possibility is worth considering for two reasons.  
First, it may shed some light on a practice that has perplexed and 
disturbed commentators for centuries.  Second, an examination of play 
in the trials of animals and objects may serve as a starting point for 
examining our own attitudes towards our legal system.
PART I: BACKGROUND
In 17th Century Germany, non-clerical matters were decided in courts of 
customary law by the Schoffen, groups of respected laymen who worked 
part-time, favored oral procedures and handed down decisions without 
explaining how they had reached them.  Litigants who were involved in
complex cases, however, often preferred to use written pleadings, which 
their lawyers would adorn with elaborate arguments and innumerable
citations to Roman law.  As a result, written pleadings were sometimes
difficult for the Schoffen to follow.  When the Schoffen could not follow 
the pleadings, they were required by law to send the entire written record
to professors in the law faculty of a reputable university and abide by 
whatever decision the professors made.  The practice, known as 
Aktenversendung, ate up much of the law professors’ time—there were 
periods in German history when writing opinions was the major activity 
of certain law faculties. 1  When one reads about “complex cases” and 
German professors, one imagines multi-party contract disputes and 
convoluted wills, not the question of what to do with an unruly cow.  Yet 
in July of 1621 the Law Faculty of Leipzig handed down a decision 
condemning a cow to death for killing a woman named Catharina 
Fritzchen.  The professors ordered that the “homicidal cow” be 
transported to a “remote, desolate location,” executed, and buried on the 
spot.2
It seems an inefficient way to put down an animal that has killed a 
human being.  A trial consumes time and energy.  The animal, 
presumably a menace to the community and undoubtedly a distressing 
reminder of someone’s death, must be kept alive until the final verdict is 
handed down.  In cases where the Schoffen court resorted to 
Aktenversendung, the final verdict might be delayed for many months.  
The court’s use of the same formal procedure that one would use to 
prosecute a human seems ridiculous. Someone coming across the 
3Leipzig decision in an obscure archive might well be tempted to dismiss 
the incident as a freak occurrence.  However, the Leipzig trial was not an 
aberration; it was not even unusual.  Records indicate that legal actions 
against non-humans (whether animals or objects) were once wide-spread.
In 1906, historian E.P. Evans gathered together an extensive collection 
of primary documents (mostly fragments of court records) describing 
actions against animals and inanimate objects. He also attempted to 
catalogue everything anyone ever wrote about these proceedings.  His 
Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals has become 
the standard reference on the subject and includes descriptions of actions 
against dozens of different kinds of animals: “asses, beetles, 
bloodsuckers, bulls, caterpillars, cockchafers3, cocks, cows, dogs, 
dolphins, eels, field mice, flies, goats, grasshoppers, horses, locusts, mice, 
moles, rats, serpents, sheep, slugs, snails, swine, termites, turtledoves, 
weevils4, wolves, worms and non-descript vermin.”5 The majority of 
cases involved pigs, however, for pigs ran freely through the streets of 
European towns for centuries and “were frequently involved in 
altercations, particularly with small children.”6
It is unknown exactly how many animals were formally tried and 
subjected to capital punishment in Europe, but E. P. Evans provided 
hundreds of examples. In addition, legal actions against animals and 
inanimate objects occurred in other societies as well, though the 
proceedings took radically different forms. 
The Athenians had a special building, called the Prytaneum, dedicated to 
hearing cases where—(1) the murderer was unknown, (2) a human death 
was caused by an inanimate object, or (3) an animal had caused the death 
of a human.  These trials were ceremonial in character.  The Athenians 
had a general notion that any time someone was killed, whether on 
purpose or by accident, his Erinys or avenging spirit had to be appeased. 
The trials held in the Prytaneum were supposed to accomplish this goal.  
Nevertheless, the trials followed ordinary procedural rules.7
The Bible explicitly required that animals who had harmed a human 
being be put to death: “if an ox gores a man or a woman, that they die; 
then the ox shall be stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner 
of the ox shall be acquitted."8 According to the Talmud, the ox was not 
merely put to death; it actually underwent a trial, in the presence of 
twenty-three judges of the Sanhedrin, and a sentencing procedure. 
Furthermore, its body could not be eaten.9 European Christians invariably 
cited this passage from Exodus as justification for their own animal trials. 
Secular courts in modern-day France began hearing trials of individual 
animals accused of specific crimes as early as the beginning of the 12th
century.10 Ecclesiastical trials of pests and vermin trace even further 
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usually accused of being a public nuisance, tried in absentia and 
anathematized or ex-communicated.12
England developed an institution called the deodand—under this law, 
which traces back to the 12th century and possibly even earlier, any 
personal chattel which was found by a jury to have caused the death of a 
person was forfeit to the king.13 These trials were different from the 
Athenian ones because the outcome was not pre-determined.  Rather, it 
hinged on a jury’s findings regarding the motion of the object. If they 
found that the motion of the object was the cause of death, the object was 
a deodand and was forfeited to the king; if the motion of the object was 
not the cause of death, the object was left alone.14  In the Lord of the 
Manor of Hampstead Case, for example, “a cart met a wagon loaded 
upon the road, and the cart endeavouring to pass by… overturned, and 
threw the person that was in the cart just before the wheels of the 
wagon.” The jury in that case decided that cart, wagon, loadings and 
horses were deodands because they had “moved unto death.”15  In 
another case, a man riding upon a horse was trying to ford a river, was 
swept into the water and drowned.  The horse was not found a deodand 
“for the water, and not the horse was the cause of his death.”16
In 17the and 18th century Russia, trials were held whenever there was a 
crime, whether or not a human defendant was available.  Sometimes, 
corpses were dragged into the courtroom and, if they were found guilty, 
were later hanged. If there was no body, an effigy was used.  Sometimes 
objects that had some connection to the crime were tried and executed.  
For example, papers and notebooks containing treacherous or heretical 
material were routinely tried and burned at the stake. In Kazan’ in 1775, 
the local authorities tried and executed a portrait of Pugachev, the late 
leader of a rebellion under Catherine the Great.17
The custom of trying animals and objects has survived into the 20th
century and beyond, albeit in a highly attenuated form. In a recent state 
appellate court case, the court refused certiorari, mandamus and habeas 
corpus relief from a trial court's order directing the destruction of a dog 
under Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 822.001-822.004 on jurisdictional 
grounds: no criminal law matter was at issue. Counsel for the dog argued 
that the case was functionally a criminal case, pointing out that the 
statutory procedure outlined in Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 822.001-
822.004 provides for the filing of a "complaint," the issuance of a 
"warrant" for seizure of the dog, and a due process hearing. In this 
particular case, the defendant was seized with several other suspects and 
later identified by the victim in a “doggie line-up”18
5In England and the United States, proceedings are still held “against the 
vessel” in maritime cases. As recently as 2001, the 11th Circuit cited The 
Palmyra, an 1827 admiralty case, for the proposition that “the thing is 
here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offense is 
attached primarily to the thing.”19 Our civil forfeiture schemes allow the 
government to confiscate property that has been used in the commission 
of a crime by bringing an action against the property itself.20 Courts have 
referred to such property as “the respondent” and “the appellant”21 and 
have even gone so far as to use the active voice (saying, for example, 
that an automobile “facilitated criminal activity” instead of simply 
saying that it was “used to transport narcotics”).22
It should be clear from these examples that actions against animals and 
inanimate objects operated in completely different ways at different times 
and in different places, but they also shared important commonalities.  
First and foremost, scholars agree that legal actions against animals and 
objects were taken seriously by all participants.  Humphrey, who wrote the 
forward to the latest edition of E.P. Evan’s collection, surveyed the 
relatively meager scholarship on legal actions against non-humans and 
concluded that this was the one focal point of consensus: legal actions 
against non-humans were not games.23  As one historian put it, the trials of 
animals and inanimate objects were “tragically real.”24  Paul Schiff 
Berman, the only scholar to have written extensively about animal trials in 
the 20 years since Humphrey wrote the Forward to The Criminal 
Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals, agrees.  Every paper he 
has written on the subject starts with the observation that the trials were 
viewed seriously: 
“Historical evidence indicates that communities viewed 
these trials seriously.” 25
“There is no indication that these proceedings were 
actually conceptualized as fictions.”26
“…the trial of an animal was not a game.”27
Considerable evidence supports these propositions. In Athens, animals 
and objects were tried in a separate courthouse, but in Europe animals 
were subjected to the same treatment as human beings.28 We know that 
animals were represented by the same lawyers. They were tried in the 
same courts. The judges heard witnesses and allowed evidence to be 
presented. The outcome of these trials was not assured; some animals 
were acquitted.  In 1457, for example, a sow was convicted of “murder 
flagrantly committed on the person of Jehan Martin, aged 5 years,” and 
sentenced to be “hanged by the hind feet to a gallows.”  Her six piglets, 
found stained with the boy’s blood, were included in the indictment as 
accomplices, but were restored to their owner “in lack of any positive 
proof that they had assisted in mangling the deceased.”29 Appeals were 
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courts were overturned or remanded for re-trial.  In one instance a pig 
and an ass were condemned to be hung. On appeal, and after a new trial, 
they were sentenced to be simply knocked on the head.30 Those 
convicted and sentenced to death were hung from the same gallows as 
humans, and if an animal managed to escape, it would be burned in 
effigy, just like a human being.31
When an executioner took it upon himself to hang a pig that had been 
arrested and detained for mauling a small child at Schweinfurt in 1576, 
he was driven from the community for usurping judiciary powers.32
Apparently, the people of Schweinfurt felt that performing an execution 
without a judicial decision was a “disgrace and detriment” to their 
town.33  This commitment to formal procedures suggests that a desire to 
observe every one of the forms prescribed by law, rather than sheer 
perverseness, drove judges and jurors to seemingly absurd extremes of 
anthropomorphism-- like torturing animals to extract confessions.34
An even stronger indication that the trials were taken seriously is the 
way in which they were discussed by contemporary observers.35  Plato, 
Demosthenes, and Aristotle all discussed the trials of animals and objects 
in a matter of fact way.36  Plutarch did not think it strange that Pericles 
and Protagoras would spend a whole day debating the particulars of a 
legal case against an object that had caused the death of a young man.37
In Europe, proceedings against animals and objects were criticized from 
their inception38 but never on the ground that the participants, thinking to 
have some fun, were in fact making a mockery of their own judicial 
system.  Medieval discussions were either theological (as when 
clergymen argued that if animals were harming a community it was the 
Devil’s work and so the proper course of action was to repent)39 or 
proto-utilitarian (as when Joducus Damhouder questioned the 
educational efficacy of trying a “dumb animal” with “no discrimination 
of good and evil”, or when Pierre Ayrault debated the pros and cons of 
treating objects as “juridical persons” following a case in which a 
Frenchman had attempted to bequeath his property to his own corpse.)40
When it comes to modern examples of proceedings against non-humans, 
there is no question that we take them seriously ourselves. There has 
been some debate about the propriety of exercising in rem jurisdiction 
over ships, but no-one would confuse an in rem proceeding in Admiralty 
with a practical joke perpetrated by the government or a performance 
piece exploring some bizarre nautical theme.
In this paper, I suggest a second commonality shared by legal actions 
against animals and objects (in addition to seriousness):  legal actions 
against animals and objects from various places, eras, and cultures 
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playfulness of deodand trials and animal prosecutions, I draw heavily on 
Homo Ludens; Huizinga’s seminal study of the play element in human 
culture. 41 According to Huizinga, play can be identified by means of 
certain characteristics even though it cannot be defined.  Huizinga 
believed that seriousness and play exist in conjunction with one another, 
and that identifying the play elements of various “serious” activities such 
as war, science, poetry, philosophy, and art would give some hint as to 
the centrality of play in the development of “serious” human culture.  
The paper is organized roughly as follows: In Part II, I summarize 
Huizinga’s theory of play and show how legal proceedings against 
animals and objects exhibited play characteristics.  In Part III, I explore 
some of the ramifications of viewing legal actions against non-humans as 
a form of play.  First, I consider what light it may shed on animal trials, a 
practice that has perplexed and disturbed commentators for centuries.  
Second, I use the examination of play in the trials of animals and objects 
as a starting point for examining our own attitudes toward play and the 
law.
8PART II: PLAY, LAW, AND NON-HUMAN DEFENDANTS
A. HUIZINGA’S THEORIES ABOUT PLAY AND SOCIETY
Huizinga declared that play is an “irreducible phenomenon”, a 
fundamental quality that cannot be defined by reference to anything 
else.42 In rejecting the conception that play can be defined by reference 
to its various functions (i.e. that play is a method of reaching some other 
ultimate goal, such as learning,43) Huizinga was not saying that play was 
useless. Huizinga main point was that any useful function play may serve 
is an effect and not a primary cause.  
Play does not “serve any master other than itself,” Huizinga argued, 
because the many social, psychological and biological explanations for 
why we play fail to address the “primordial quality” of play, it’s true 
essence: fun.  The “fun of playing,” he insisted, “resists all analysis and 
logical interpretation, which is why the play-concept must always remain 
distinct from all other forms of thought in which we express the structure 
of mental and social life.”44
Instead of concluding that play, because it cannot be defined, is nothing 
more than a fuzzy metaphor for a collection of inscrutable activities, 
Huizinga decided to observe different forms of play and describe the 
main characteristics of play as best he could.  Since his theme was the 
relation of play to culture he restricted himself to its social 
manifestations.45 Huizinga succeeded in identifying a number of features, 
but he never claimed that he had produced a comprehensive checklist or 
that the presence or absence of any particular feature was decisive. He 
admitted that his collection was “tolerable” at best.46  He used the list to 
identify playful elements of other activities. 
In terms of methodology, Huizinga47 prefigured Wittgenstein,48 who 
wrote the Philosophical Investigations shortly after homo Ludens was 
published.49  In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein took issue 
with the philosophical practice of striving to formulate the “essence” of a 
thing or concept, just as Huizinga took issue with everyone’s attempt to 
formulate the “essence” of play.50  Wittgenstein also argued that the only 
way to understand a word or concept was to look at different examples 
of the thing or different manifestations of the concept and try to identify 
the various resemblances between them.  Once a list of resemblances has 
been compiled, it is possible to use it to determine whether a new thing 
9or new concept belongs to the same “family.” Wittgenstein even used 
games51 to illustrate his most famous point.
Consider, for example, the proceedings we call “games.”  
I mean board games, card games, ball games, Olympic 
games, etc.  What is common to all these?  Don’t say 
“They have to have something in common or they would 
not be called ‘games’ –but rather look and see if there is 
something common to all… For if you look at them you 
will not see something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at 
that . . . . we see a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and cries-crossing: sometimes overall 
similarities.
I can think of no better expression to characterize these 
similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various 
resemblances between members of a family: build, 
features, eye color, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap 
and criss-cross in the same way.-And I shall say: 'games' 
form a family.52
Huizinga started with similar premises: first, he looked at many kinds of 
playful behavior and began noticing patterns.   He proceeded to examine 
social behaviors that exhibited these same patterns and gradually 
assembled a list of “play characteristics.” Finally, he used these 
characteristics to evaluate previously unexamined social phenomena.
Wittgenstein’s familiar precepts may be helpful for getting a handle on 
Huizinga’s methodology, which I follow, more or less, in this paper.  
Essentially, I examine the extent to which legal actions against animals 
and inanimate objects exhibited Huizinga’s characteristics of play.  
* * *
Huizinga identified two basic ways in which society manifests the 
various characteristics of play.  “The function of play in the… forms 
which concern us here can largely be derived from the two basic aspects 
under which we meet it: as a contest for something or a representation of 
something.”53 A game of chess is an example of competitive (or 
“agonistic”) play.  A couple of children pretending to play chess by 
taking turns moving the pieces around at random are engaged in 
representational play.  Many of the formal characteristics of play are 
common to both types of play; but some apply only to one or the other.54
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The most salient characteristic of both competitive and representational 
play is the attitude and mood of the players. 55  On the one hand, (1) they 
are on some level aware that they are only pretending.  At the very least, 
they know that the activity they are engaged in stands quite outside of 
ordinary life.56 On the other hand, (2) they are absorbed intensely and 
utterly.  (3) The “play mood” is labile—at any moment, ordinary life 
may reassert its rights and the players snap out of their absorption.  (4) 
The essence of the play-mood is fun.  It is a source of amusement and 
pleasure.  
(5) Order is another positive feature of play. It brings a temporary, 
limited perfection into an imperfect world and into the confusion of life.  
This is not to say that play is incompatible with the moral disorder 
inherent in human cruelty.  Huizinga took pains to point out that play lies 
outside good and evil. “It has no moral function,” he wrote in his 
characteristically categorical style. “The valuations of vice and virtue do 
not apply here.”57  Arguably, good sportsmanship and valor are 
analogous to virtue in certain circumscribed contexts, but I think it is 
safe to assume that Huizinga was no moral relativist and would have 
shrunk from the suggestion that play has a “special” morality all to its 
own. 
After all, it is possible to imagine a playful maiming.  An allusion to the 
“playfulness” of a torture may seem dilettante and superficial, betraying 
a profound divorce from the reality of genuine life and death concerns.  
For Huizinga, however, an activity that shares enough characteristics 
with other activities we have already accepted as playful is playful as 
well (at least to some extent), however unpleasant or counterintuitive 
such a conclusion may feel.  
We have seen that play proceeds within its own proper boundaries of 
time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner, yet 
somehow it manages to combine strict rules with genuine freedom.  (6) 
Genuine play is free, a voluntary and spontaneous activity. After all, 
when someone puts a gun to your head and tells you to “have fun” the 
best they can hope for is a strained imitation. 
(7)  Play is not connected to any material interests. A common response 
to this observation is that there are many playful activities, professional 
organized sports being the most obvious example, that are connected to a 
number of material interests.  This, again, brings us back to the point that 
play and seriousness may be intermingled.  To the extent that a player 
exhibits the play characteristics, he is at play, to the extent that he is 
driven by material interests he is at work.  (8) Play also promotes the 
formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with 
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secrecy and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise 
or other means.
Some features of play are primarily characteristic of contests and 
competitions.  (9) Contests are characterized by tension—not knowing 
whether you will “pull it off”. (10) The mood is one of wanting to excel 
above others
Representational play, on the other hand, is characterized by (11) 
exhibition and (12) imaginative transformation.  Transformation is not so 
much the creation of a “sham reality” but rather a new reality—a 
transformation of one object into another that seems perfectly real.  Are 
Christians taking communion engaged in representational play? Huizinga 
never addressed this question directly, but he did admit that there was a 
close connection between ritual and play.  Nevertheless, he refused to 
conflate the two.  Genuine play, he argued, possesses an essential feature 
that may well be incompatible with ritual acts and sacred rites—the 
consciousness, however latent, of “only pretending” (characteristic (1)).  
Thus, according to Huizinga’s theory, the Catholic who takes 
communion with the firm belief that the wine has turned into the blood 
of Christ is not playing, at least not by Huizinga’s definition, but rather 
participating in a religious ritual.  The Catholic who does not believe in 
transubstantiation, on the other hand, may well be “playing along” rather 
than participating in the Eucharist.  Whether or not the latent 
consciousness of only pretending is actually incompatible with ritual is a 
question Huizinga leaves open, and is certainly beyond the scope of this 
paper.
* * *
Huizinga’s goal in Homo Ludens was to demonstrate that play is a 
structure that manifests itself in all spheres of human culture.  “My 
object is not to define the place of play among all other manifestations of 
culture,” he wrote in the forward, “but rather to ascertain how far culture 
itself bears the character of play.” Thus, he used his list of “formal 
characteristics” as a model, trying to show how far various forms of 
culture (law, war, science, poetry, philosophy, and art) manifest those 
characteristics. 
In his chapter on the law, he argued that legal proceedings manifest a 
great number of play characteristics.58 To some extent, legal 
proceedings are characterized by a playful, “I’m only pretending” mood 
(feature 1).  There is usually a collective sense of standing apart from 
everyday life, which contributes to this sensation.  Justice often takes 
place in a court of law, a spot cut off from the rest of the world.  
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Order is another feature of play (feature 2), and legal proceedings have 
always been subject to a system of restrictive, inward-looking rules 
(consider the Rule against Perpetuities or the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence). Like games, trials bring a 
temporary, limited perfection into an imperfect world.  Even the ugliest 
child custody battle imposes a perfectly symmetrical structure on a story 
teeming with confused and chaotic human emotions.   
Huizinga characterized legal proceedings as almost purely competitive. 
He pointed out that judicial contests were characterized by tension and 
uncertainty as to the outcome (feature 9).  In fact, justice has been 
associated with games of chance for hundreds of years59  In addition, 
judicial contests are not about domination; the primary thing is to excel 
above others, to be first, to be honored (feature 10).  
Huizinga also went to great pains to describe the existence of practices 
(past and present) in which the cultural function of jurisprudence is 
barely separate from the sphere of play, where there is a clear 
consciousness of playing or “just pretending.”60  He described the 
drumming contests still being used by Greenland Eskimos to resolve 
disputes and the haberfeldtreiben, satirical and comic sessions that used 
to be held in peasant courts, particularly in Germanic countries, where all 
sorts of relatively minor sexual offenses were judged and punished.61
B. HOW LEGAL ACTIONS AGAINST ANIMALS AND OBJECTS MANIFEST
THE CHARACTER OF PLAY.62
Trials of animals and objects exhibited many of Huizinga’s 
characteristics of play.  There was, however, a major difference between 
non-human trials and “normal” trials: they were less competitive and 
more representational.  Trials of animals and objects were less like 
baseball and more like playing house.  
We have seen that most salient characteristic of both competitive and 
representational play is the attitude and mood of the players.  In dealing 
with actions against animals and objects, what is tricky to establish is the 
presence or absence of a “play mood.” There’s no way to tell what the 
participants were thinking, in part because of the paucity of records 
related to this subject.  There are, however, suggestions or glimmers of 
levity, or rather an odd mix of levity and gravitas.  Interestingly, 
Huizinga saw this kind of lability as a hallmark of the play attitude 
(feature #3).  “The “play mood” is labile,” Huizinga wrote.  “At any 
moment, ordinary life may reassert its rights and the players snap out of 
their absorption.”  
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An example of a trial in which the participants seemed to be aware that 
they were only pretending is a famous Russian trial of a church bell, 
which was built almost entirely around an elaborate pun.  The bell had 
been rung to warn the inhabitants of the towns that invaders were coming. 
Once the invaders had taken over the town, they brought an action 
against the bell for treason, for which the traditional punishment was to 
tear out the perpetrator’s tongue.  Once the bell had been convicted, they 
proceeded to punish it by removing its clapper, which is called a 
“tongue” in Russian.63
Another example of a trial glimmering with suggestions of playfulness is 
the trial of the rats of Autun. These rats were tried before an 
ecclesiastical court for wanton destruction of barley crops in 1522.  
When the rats failed to appear in court, their appointed counsel, 
Chassenee, argued that the original writ of summons failed to give the 
rats appropriate notice.  The defendants, he pointed out, were dispersed 
over a large tract of countryside—a single summons was inadequate to 
notify them all.  The summons was also grammatically defective.  The 
court ordered a second summons to be read from the pulpit of every local 
parish church, but the rats failed to appear again.  Chassenee then made a 
long, grandiloquent speech.  His main point was that if a person is cited 
to appear in a place but cannot do so safely, he may lawfully refuse to 
obey the writ.  Since the rats were likely to be attacked by cats if they 
attempted to comply with the summons, they did not have to appear in 
court either.64
An example of jocular language can be found in a fourteenth century 
Swiss case brought against a swarm of Spanish flies.  In that case, the 
judge ordered the appointment of counsel to represent the flies “in 
consideration of their small size and the fact that they had not yet 
reached their majority.”65 The order seems like a joke—the judge clearly 
intended to appoint counsel, but perhaps he did not take his order as 
seriously as an excommunication. The hints of playfulness are even more 
pronounced in a 1519 trial against some field-mice in Western Tyrol.  At 
the conclusion of the case, an agreement was reached whereby the mice 
would be moved to a new tract of land.  The defense lawyer argued that 
they should be provided with safe conduct, to protect them from the 
danger of cat attacks.  The judge agreed to the safe conduct, but only for 
the “weakest and most vulnerable” field-mice:  those “with young” and 
those “yet in their infancy”.  
No-one will ever know what it is like to be another person.  Speculating as 
to other people’s subjective experiences is fraught with danger, for there is 
always the chance that you will inadvertently attribute your own ideas, 
perceptions and emotions to someone else, revealing nothing about your 
subject and everything about yourself. At the same time, it would be 
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wrong to go to the opposite extreme and assume that the 17th century 
Europeans were so different from us that they did not have anything 
resembling a sense of humor.  If we are amused at the thought of parish 
priests reading aloud to the vermin, there is no reason for us to assume 
that the ecclesiastical tribunal that came up with the suggestion could not 
have been amused also. I admit that we can never know for sure-- the 
record of the trial of the rats of Autun provides no explicit information 
about anybody’s mood or mind-set—but under the circumstances, it 
seems likely that a degree of playfulness and levity characterized those 
proceedings. 
Paul Rubin, Esq., a partner at the DC law firm of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & 
Maw who represented a couple of dogs accused of mauling some 
ostriches in 1999, hinted at the combination of seriousness and play that 
probably characterized some trials of animals and objects. One the one 
hand, he found the case personally amusing.  On the other hand, he felt 
badly for the dogs and for the dogs’ innocent owners and worked hard on 
the case. He joked about the dogs in the office and was surprised when 
the court reacted to his opening joke with stony silence. On the other 
hand, he was entirely un-amused when the canine defendants were 
banished to a state “not bordering Virginia,” a detail I found particularly 
absurd.66
A preoccupation with order was another important characteristic of play 
(feature #5), and the people who participated in actions against animals 
and inanimate objects were often concerned with maintaining order and 
symmetry by adhering to formal rules.
For example, judges who wanted to be lenient with homicidal animals 
sometimes adhered to the letter of the law, allowing the executioners to 
strangle animals who had been sentenced to be burned alive only after 
the animal had been ceremoniously singed.67  When Stephen VI became 
pope in 896, one of his first acts was to cause the body of his predecessor, 
Formossus, to be exhumed.  His putrid corpse was handed a writ of 
summons and the new pope waited patiently until Formossus failed to 
arrive on the appointed day.  He was then dragged to the council hall of 
St. Peters, arrayed in full pontificals and tried for having “unlawfully and 
sacrilegiously usurped the papal dignity.”68
Ecclesiastical trials of pests and vermin were perhaps even more 
formalistic. In Valence in 1585, a prosecution against caterpillars argued 
by secular and canon jurists involved so many motions and dragged on 
for so long that the caterpillars entered a new stage of their lepidopterous 
cycle, causing unknowable complications.  A proceeding against some 
snout beetles involved such a large number of procedural motions that it 
lasted for well over a year.69
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In England, the law of deodand was inordinately convoluted, almost as 
though the jurists were taking a perverse pleasure in coming up with the 
most abstruse rules. For example, no deodand was due if a child fell 
from a cart or a horse, so long as the cart or horse was not in motion.  If 
an adult fell and was killed, however, the cart was forfeit.  If a cart or 
horse ran over a human being of its own motion, it would be a deodand 
irrespective of the victim’s age.  If a thing that was not in motion causes 
a person’s death, only the part that is the immediate cause of the death 
was forfeited.  However, if a man fell from a part of a boat (for example, 
the mizzen-top) and was drowned, the entire ship and cargo are deodand.  
But only if the accident occurred in fresh water-- no deodands are due 
for accidents on the high seas. And so on.70
Finally, legal actions against animals and inanimate objects exhibited 
both of Huizinga’s characteristics of representational play.  
Representational play is characterized by exhibition (feature #11) and 
imaginative transformation (feature #12).  Transformation is not so much 
the creation of a “sham reality” but rather a new reality—a 
transformation of one object into another that seems perfectly real.  
Often the trials and executions of animals were exhibitions. (Feature 
#11). Trials of objects were exhibitions as well.  Like all trials and 
executions at the time, these proceedings were public spectacles in the 
sense that they were conducted with the active participation of the 
community.  Hearings of any sort were usually held “in the open air, at 
the gate of the castle or at the public meeting-place of the town.” 71
Legal actions against non-humans also involved imaginative 
transformation, for they were characterized by intense 
anthropomorphism (feature #12)– almost invariably, the animals and 
objects were transformed into person-like beings.  Consider the example 
of the pig of Falaise, strung up from the gallows in the market square in 
1386.72   Records indicate that the pig had been formally tried and 
convicted of infanticide, “having torn off the face and arm of a child that 
later died from his injuries.”  The pig was sentenced to be mangled about 
the head and forelegs, strangled, and hanged, but for some reason, it was 
dressed up in a jacket and breeches prior to being mutilated and strangled 
up in the public square.73
Another example of intense anthropomorphism can be found in the joint 
trial of Jacques Feron and his donkey—the two were caught in flagrante 
delicto in 1750 in small town in France.  Feron himself was sentenced to 
death, but the animal was acquitted, after due process of law, on the 
ground that she was the victim of violence and had not participated in 
her master’s crime of her own free will.  The key piece of evidence in the 
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donkey’s trial was a certificate that had been drawn up by the parish 
priest.  The document described the donkey’s personality as though it 
were a human being.  The priest vouched for the fact that she had always 
been “virtuous and well-behaved” and a “most honest creature in word 
and deed and in all her habits of life.” 
Even objects have been personified. Consider the Lord of the Manor of 
Hampstead Case I discussed in section I: “a cart met a wagon loaded 
upon the road, and the cart endeavouring to pass by… overturned, and 
threw the person that was in the cart just before the wheels of the 
wagon.” There are no references to human actors in the entire case, and 
all the objects are referred to in the active voice.74
It would be a mistake to suggest that all trials of animals and objects 
exhibited play characteristics.  Nevertheless, a sufficient number of 
Huizinga’s characteristics were apparent in a sufficient number of trials 
to suggest that play was an important element in these proceedings.
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PART III: SO WHAT?
So far, I have been exploring the possibility that legal actions against 
non-humans (whether animals or objects) may have been playful as well 
as serious. The possibility is worth considering for two reasons.  First, it 
may shed some light on a practice that has perplexed and disturbed 
commentators for centuries.  Second, an examination of play in the trials 
of animals and objects may serve as a starting point for examining our 
own attitudes toward the law.
A ALL THE LIZARDS STAND AND SAY “YES, YES, YES.”75
AN ALTERNATIVE TO EXPLANATION
Explanations of legal actions against objects and animals are as varied as 
they are contradictory.  The most obvious explanations dismiss the trials 
of animals and objects as throwbacks to a “less advanced” past. Either 
the trials were manifestations of mindless retaliation (like kicking the 
chair you just fell off of) and or they were proof that human beings once
stupid enough to attribute anthropomorphic and demonic qualities to 
animals and objects.76
According to Esther Cohen, such interpretations come up against a major
stumbling-block: 
All sources clearly indicate that animal trials, both secular 
and ecclesiastical, became common practice in the later 
middle-ages, reaching their peak of frequency and greatest 
geographic scope during the fifteenth, sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries… Those facts were difficult to square 
with the picture of humanity advancing in linear 
progression from the superstitious middle ages to the
rational nineteenth century…. Indeed, [Evans] announced 
that “strangely enough, it was in the latter half of the 
seventeenth century, an age of comparative enlightenment, 
that this cruel penalty seems to have been most frequently 
inflicted.” Most of his colleagues, though, were content to 
telescope the entire European past into one static era of 
irrationality, thus neatly shelving the problem.77
Many commentators have taken a different tack, attempting to identify a 
logical, self-interested explanation for the behavior of the participants.  
For example, some people have suggested that animal trials might have 
served to deter negligence on the part of the animal’s owner.78 Of course, 
in virtually all cases, the animal would be tried and executed even after it 
had been sold to an unwitting owner.  Others have argued that the trials 
were meant to instill horror in other animals. Leibniz, who toyed with 
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this argument, noted that African lions were crucified to drive away 
other lions, that wolves were hanged for the same reason, and that 
peasants nail birds of prey to the doors of their houses.79  But then, there 
is nothing particularly mysterious about the desire to put down a 
dangerous animal.  The mystery is why the animal ought to be tried in a 
court of law first.
Other commentators were more cynical.  And according to Philippe de 
Beaumanoir (the author of a 13th century customal, a collection of the 
customs of the province where he lived) the only justification for animal 
trials lay in the cupidity of seigneurial authorities reluctant to relinquish a 
profitable source of income.  He argued that the practice was juridically 
meaningless and invalid, for all crime presupposed intent, and beasts 
possessing neither a knowledge of good and evil nor malicious intentions 
could not be held responsible for their actions.80
The law of deodands was also supposed to have survived because if the 
financial benefits that accrued to the crown. It is not at all clear, however, 
that this was the case.  Many deodands were off little value, and 
presumably more resources were expended during the trial than the 
deodand itself was worth.81  Furthermore, deodand trials sometimes
occurred even when the owner of the deodand was destitute and there 
was a tacit understanding that the property would not actually be 
confiscated.  In colonial Virginia, for example, deodands were returned 
to the rightful owners if they alleged in a special petition that they were 
destitute, but only after they had passed, symbolically, outside the realm 
of private property.82
Blackstone’s attempts to determine some logical explanation for the 
institution of the deodand are particularly amusing.83 Culling through 
examples of deodand trials, Blackstone noticed some curious distinctions, 
which I have already described in the section on how legal actions 
against animals and objects manifest the character of play.  Recall that 
no deodand is due if a child falls from a cart or a horse, so long as the 
cart or horse is not in motion; but if an adult falls and is killed, the thing 
is forfeit.  Sir Mathew Hale had attempted to explain this by observing 
that children cannot take care of themselves. Blackstone attempted to 
improve upon this explanation, suggesting that since the institution of the 
deodand was originally intended to pay for masses for those who died 
suddenly and in sin, they were not necessary for children, who were 
incapable of sin.  Inconveniently, if a cart or horse runs over a human 
being of its own motion, it shall be a deodand irrespective of the victim’s 
age.  Blackstone valiantly addressed this point, conjecturing that since 
the accidents involving moving objects were more likely to have been 
caused by the owner’s negligence, forfeiture was necessary to encourage 
vigilance.  But then Blackstone noted that negligence played no part in 
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the jury’s determination of whether an object was a deodand or not.  If a 
thing that is not in motion causes a person’s death, only the part that is 
the immediate cause of the death is forfeited.  For example, if a man tries 
to climb onto a wagon and falls off, only the part that he stepped on is 
forfeit.  If he is run over by a cart, the whole thing is forfeit, including 
the load.  Blackstone may have exhausted his energies at this point of the 
discussion, for he does not attempt to explain this rule. He relates that if 
a man falls from a boat in fresh water and is drowned, the ship and cargo 
are deodand, but no deodands are due for accidents on the high seas.  
This Blackstone dismisses as “a simple matter of jurisdiction” at which 
point he abruptly shifts to a different topic. The entire discussion, 
measured by Blackstone's usual standard, is remarkably incoherent; he 
struggles, but is unable to make rational sense of the existing rules. 84
Probably the most convincing explanations are psychological.  Gratian, 
the first man to gather he canon law into an intelligible form at the 
beginning of the 12th century was also the first to propose that animals 
were being executed in order that the hateful act might be forgotten.85
This echos a Jewish explanation: “that the animal should not pass through 
the streets and people say, 'This is the animal on account of which so-and-
so was stoned.'"86
Modern explanations are more nuanced.  Evans suggested that the 
benefits of such trials might be more indirect.  For example, he remarked 
that it was in the interest of ecclesiastical dignitaries to keep up the trials 
because it strengthened their influence and extended their authority to be 
seen subjecting even the caterpillar and the canker-worm to their 
dominion and control.87 Humphrey has suggested that “the whole 
purpose of the legal actions was to establish cognitive control.  In other 
words, the job of the courts was to domesticate chaos, to impose order on 
a world of accidents – and specifically to make sense of certain 
seemingly inexplicable events by redefining them as crimes.”88 Jacob 
Finkelstein proposed that people were extremely conscious of the fact 
that animals existed on a lower level in the hierarchy of creation.  By 
killing a human being, the animal infringed that order and was subject to 
punishment.89 Esther Cohen has argued that the secular trials re-affirmed 
society’s self-image as universally just, while the ecclesiastical trials 
provided the setting for a communal ritual of self and environmental 
purification from inimical forces.90
Paul Schiff Berman has recently resurrected some of these theories and 
expressed them in modern anthropological terms. In a series of law 
review articles, he has argued that that the trials of animals and
inanimate objects allowed the participants to create “cleansing” 
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narratives.  The trials, he has written, were “cultural performances” that 
“provided a ritual mechanism for healing the community.”91
I do not mean to rebut these various contentions. Many, as I have 
mentioned, are perfectly plausible.  Nevertheless, I am not entirely 
satisfied. And I am not alone. The practice of trying animals and objects 
has perplexed and disturbed commentators for centuries.  As far as I can 
tell, every author to write on the subject has expressed some degree of 
discomfort, regardless of how plausible their own explanations have 
been. 
Consider Humphrey’s statement: “I do not know the explanation, and 
can only leave it for historians to answer for themselves,” followed by 
several pages of speculation.  “I dare say that the one reason [for the 
reticence of historians] has been the lack, at the level of theory, of 
anything sensible to say.”
“What were they up to, these punishers of animals? What was the point?” 
asks Ewald. “I am not sure; and the longer I dwell on the question, the 
more uneasy and uncertain I become.” In the following paragraph, Ewald 
seems to be speaking for everyone who felt compelled to delve into the 
history of these proceedings:
If we could gather together in a single room all the great 
thinkers who have written about animal trials -- Moses, 
Plato, Gratian, Aquinas, Leibniz, Blackstone -- and ask 
them to explain themselves, what would they say? What 
would they say to the others? What would they think to 
themselves? Perhaps -- the possibility is not farfetched --
they would have nothing at all to say. Perhaps they would 
find the infliction of punishment as mysterious as we do.
Perhaps even Chassenee, for all his deep learning on the 
subject, never really understood the animal trials --
nobody knows what they were for, and nobody has ever 
known.92
If for no other reason, my account of legal proceedings against animals 
and inanimate objects may offer such commentators some degree of 
relief by suggesting that a satisfying explanation for animal trials has not 
been found because an explanation does not exist.  Huizinga proposed 
that play is an “irreducible phenomena”, a fundamental quality that 
cannot be defined by reference to anything else.93 If he is right, it follows 
that if these trials had a playful element, they had an un-definable 
element. 
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B LAW AND PLAY IN THE HERE AND NOW
Huizinga did not end his inquiry regarding play with the observation that 
play was irreducible.  Likewise, there is no reason to end the inquiry 
regarding legal actions against animals and objects with the observation 
that if these trials had a playful element, they necessarily had an un-
definable element as well.  After pasting some photos into the family 
album, we can continue to look for new family members.  A 
comprehensive search is beyond the scope of this paper, but I would like 
to conclude with a few remarks.
First, you do not need to read Huizinga or learn the word “illinex” to see 
that American life is replete with games.  We are obsessed with playing 
and watching sports. Baseball is not just the national game; it is the 
national pastime. Soldiers train for their missions using modified video 
games. Computers (which can now be found in 53% of American homes) 
come with pre-installed games like Minesweeper and Freecell.94  State-
run lotteries have exploded, as have casinos and internet gambling sites. 
What you do with your time affects how you look at the world. Life for 
us is a game that produces “winners” and “losers,” terms that have no 
precise equivalent in any language I can think of. Science is now a game-
- Consider the “space race.”  Elections are “races” also.  When the Gore-
Lieberman ticket was defeated in the notorious 2000 presidential election, 
republicans displayed Sore-Loserman posters on TV.95
It is a small wonder that scholars and judges have filled reams of paper 
with discussion of the many characteristics shared by modern American 
legal proceedings and competitive games. Arthur Leff has argued that 
neither the adversary structure nor the winner-take-all format of the 
American trial is designed to elicit truth and justice, these things make 
sense only as products of larger cultural themes in which agonistic 
games dominate daily life.96  American trials, Leff observed, are an 
enactment of a deeply held cultural aesthetic. Bart Giamatti, whose life 
included time spent as president of Yale and as Commissioner of 
Baseball, articulates this “aesthetic” in his explanation of how the 
practice of law resembles baseball: “law--defined as a complex of formal 
rules, agreed-upon boundaries, authoritative arbiters, custom, and a set of 
symmetrical opportunities and demands--is enshrined in baseball . . . . 
(S)ymmetrical surfaces, deep arithmetical patterns, and a vast, stable 
body of rules ensure competitive balance in both games…” 97 The 
similarities have not been lost on practitioners.  Hundreds of judges have 
found the relationship between law and baseball substantial enough to 
mention in their written opinions, suggesting that they perceive a 
fundamental similarity between the two.98
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Recollect any scene from any television court show-- Judge Judy 
excoriating an adulterer, for example. Like the haberfeldtreiben, Judge 
Judy’s trials are partly serious, partly an exhibition and a joke. And 
that’s not even considering the situation in England, where most 
barristers continue to wear wigs, as do their counterparts in at least 20 
countries of the former empire. 99 According to Huizinga, there is no 
single article of clothing that “illustrates more aptly the playfulness of 
the cultural impulse.”100 Our casual acceptance of legal goofiness 
suggests there is a collective tolerance for and awareness of the play 
elements of legal culture.  
A second general observation is that given the context of playfulness in 
our judicial system, and given the possibility that the element of play has 
always been a part of proceedings against animals and objects, it may 
well be that in rem forfeitures are a further example of this general 
phenomenon.  
Like trials of animals and deodands, the guilty property fiction 
underlying certain in rem actions has survived a great deal of academic 
criticism and innumerable constitutional challenges. Critics of civil 
forfeiture have argued that the ancient fiction was never discarded 
because it allowed the government to profit economically by seizing 
property that would not otherwise be within its constitutional reach.101
Other scholars have argued that discarding the guilty property fiction 
would have disrupted too many other legal doctrines.102
Berman has tried to zero in on the social function of civil forfeitures, 
arguing that these forfeitures are a method for “healing the community.”  
This argument makes sense in certain contexts.103  For example, in 
early1995, two policemen happened upon Mr. Bennis while he was 
engaged in a grossly indecent activity with a local prostitute in the back 
of the family car.  Mr. Bennis's indiscretion made its way to the Supreme 
Court, which held in Bennis v. Michigan that the state had not violated 
Mrs. Bennis's constitutional rights when it seized her car, an 11-year-old 
Pontiac sedan she had just purchased for $600.  The Court justified the 
seizure of Mrs. Bennis's property on the grounds that the government 
was acting against the car itself, not against the car's innocent owner.  
Since the car had been used to violate Michigan's indecency laws, it was 
"guilty" of being a public nuisance, and thus forfeit to the state.  Berman 
arguing that the 1977 Pontiac could be seen as a symbol of the 
breakdown of the community's moral order. Thus the authorities might 
wish to remove the object as a sort of symbolic "banishment." 104 It is 
unclear, however, who is healed by an action against $405,089.23 U.S. 
Currency.105
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The entire debate is highly reminiscent of the debates of the past: 
interminable, marked by moments of plausibility, yet somehow 
unsatisfying.  Perhaps the tenacity of the guilty property fiction is 
another phenomenon that cannot be “explained”, is merely a 
manifestation of the playfulness inherent in the legal system.  
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